A perfectly stable balance of deterrence may not even be desirable, let alone achievable.

Evidence

So we may get stability without cooperation, or we may not find it even with cooperation. Still, some kind of cooperation with the Russians, or mutual restraint, formal or informal, tacit or explicit, may prove to make a significant difference in the stability of the balance of terror; and the stakes of course are very high. So although we cannot be sure that a deliberate policy of collaborating to make each side’s retaliatory forces invulnerable would make any difference, we have to consider that it might and to ask ourselves whether in fact we should want a perfectly stable balance of deterrence if we had the option before us. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581

Categorization

• QUESTION: Why does Schelling doubt we’d want a perfectly stable deterrence? The implicit answer — that vulnerability is what makes threats credible — is worth chasing later.
• XREF: connects to: Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529; Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581

Related

• Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. (similarity 0.86)
• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.86)
• Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties (similarity 0.81)
• Literal disarmament of horrific weapons can increase instability rather than peace. (similarity 0.79)
• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation may not suffice to arrest instability in the arms race. #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 581