Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone.

Evidence

A rule can never be binding just because some person with physical power wants it to be so. He must have authority to issue the rule or it is no rule, and such authority can only come from another rule which is already binding on those to whom he speaks. That is the difference between a valid law and the orders of a gunman. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48

Categorization

• XREF: The gunman scenario is a foundational thought experiment in jurisprudence; connects to the rule-of-recognition concept. — connects to: Rights and obligations can bind genuinely without being absolute. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 139; Prohibition laws work as normative signals, not criminal sanctions — , The Rod and the Child: A Global History…, 10897; A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be binding just because some person with physical power wants it to be so. He must have authority to issue the rule or it is no rule, and such authority can only come from another rule which is already binding on those to whom he speaks. That is the difference between a valid law and the orders of a gunman. (+22 more)

Broader Connections

• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force #corroborates (0.70) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. #complicates (0.50) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval #complicates (0.50) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437
• Legal major premises derive authority from constitutional text or statutes #expands (0.45) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 242
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. #complicates (0.40) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15
• Legal propositions are true when they invite competent professional assent. #complicates (0.40) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 387
• A legal principle emerges from a long line of decisions. #qualifies (0.40) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 134
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. #corroborates (0.35) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386