Unlawful power is real, not a mere negatable possibility

Evidence

We make an important distinction between law and even the general orders of a gangster. We feel that the law’s strictures-and its sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the outlaw’s commands are not. Austin’s analysis has no place for any such distinction, because it defines an obligation as subjection to the threat of force, and so founds the authority of law entirely on the sovereign’s ability and will to harm those who disobey. Perhaps the distinction we make is illusory-perhaps our feelings of some special authority attaching to the law is based on religious hangover or another sort of mass self-deception. But Austin does not demonstrate this, and we are entitled to insist that an analysis of our concept of law either acknowledge and explain our attitudes, or show why they are mistaken. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy; Uncredible power invites dangerous testing that triggers force; Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 (+1 more)

Related

• Hart points out that Austin’s view that every rule is a general command obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he… (similarity 0.83)
• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force (similarity 0.83)
• Unlawful power is real and must be reckoned with. (similarity 0.83)
• Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. (similarity 0.81)
• Legitimacy and physical force are symbolically interlinked, not opposites (similarity 0.80)
• Legal coercion lacks a satisfactory account even in clear cases (similarity 0.80)
• Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy (similarity 0.79)
• Concepts of law and legal obligation must stay until shown illusory (similarity 0.79)
• Law is not reducible to commands backed by sovereign force (similarity 0.78)
• Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? (similarity 0.78)
• A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. A rule can never be… (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force #corroborates (0.60) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40
• Uncredible power invites dangerous testing that triggers force #expands (0.55)
• Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy #qualifies (0.50)