Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance.

Evidence

Austin had said that every rule is a general command, and that a person is obligated under a rule if he is liable to be hurt should he disobey it. Hart points out that this obliterates the distinction between being obliged to do something and being obligated to do it. If one is bound by a rule he is obligated, not merely obliged, to do what it provides, and therefore being bound by a rule must be different from being subject to an injury if one disobeys an order. A rule differs from an order, among other ways, by being normative, by setting a standard of behavior that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47

Categorization

  • QUESTION: How does the obliged/obligated distinction hold up against later critiques of Hart’s separation of law and morality?
  • XREF: This is the classic Hart-vs-Austin command theory debate; connects to the subsequent evolution in legal positivism. — connects to: Rights and obligations can bind genuinely without being absolute. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 139; Legitimate political authority rests on an exchange of protection for obedience. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 558; Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? (+9 more)

Broader Connections