Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force

Evidence

We make an important distinction between law and even the general orders of a gangster. We feel that the law’s strictures-and its sanctions-are different in that they are obligatory in a way that the outlaw’s commands are not. Austin’s analysis has no place for any such distinction, because it defines an obligation as subjection to the threat of force, and so founds the authority of law entirely on the sovereign’s ability and will to harm those who disobey. Perhaps the distinction we make is illusory-perhaps our feelings of some special authority attaching to the law is based on religious hangover or another sort of mass self-deception. But Austin does not demonstrate this, and we are entitled to insist that an analysis of our concept of law either acknowledge and explain our attitudes, or show why they are mistaken. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Fuller’s and later natural law critiques of legal positivism, and the Hart-Fuller debate on the separation of law and morality. — connects to: Modern atrocity operates inside the law rather than through its suspension.; Hegemony works by winning consent backed by coercion, not by force alone. — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 905; Rights and obligations can bind genuinely without being absolute. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 139 (+27 more)
• SEED: The framing of obligation as distinct from force — gangster orders vs. law — is a serviceable essay hook for explaining why citizens feel duties toward law beyond fear of punishment.

Broader Connections

• Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. #corroborates (0.85) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47
• Compelled compliance under a threat of unpleasant consequences is being obliged. #complicates (0.75) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 141