Rights and obligations can bind genuinely without being absolute.
Evidence
It is not that the government may never, under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, draw a distinction based on race. Rather, the government may draw such a distinction only if it has a compelling interest in doing so, and the fact that the interest must be compelling (rather than simply substantial, legitimate, or rational) shows exactly how a right, like a rule and like an obligation, can make a genuine difference without being absolute. What there is a reason to do is different from what should be done, all things considered, just as what there is a right to do is different from what the right-holder actually gets to do, all things considered. — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 139
Categorization
- DEFINE: Explains that an obligation or right can be decisive-needing-a-compelling-reason without being absolute.
- XREF: connects to: Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48; Courts extend general rules without committing a fallacy when underlying conditions match. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1112; Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47 (+7 more)
Related
- Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance. (similarity 0.81)
- Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations? (similarity 0.80)
- The concepts of legal right and obligation, despite daily reliance, resist clear definition. (similarity 0.79)
- Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Normative obligation differs fundamentally from being threatened into compliance.
#expands(0.85) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 47 - Any moral principle admitting its opposite becomes meaningless without unambiguous situations
#contradicts(0.85) - Legal obligation differs from mere coercion by threat of force
#expands(0.80) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 40 - Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will
#corroborates(0.80) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356 - Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone.
#expands(0.75) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48 - Perfect silence as an unattainable absolute still functions as real and necessary
#epitomizes(0.70) - Decisions among incommensurable values remain possible without a decision rule.
#corroborates(0.65) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 426 - Courts extend general rules without committing a fallacy when underlying conditions match.
#expands(0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1112 - The concepts of legal right and obligation, despite daily reliance, resist clear definition.
#qualifies(0.55) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 0