Even conflict between adversaries can be modeled as partnership discipline

Evidence

It deserves to be emphasized that nonzero-sum games can as properly be classed under theory of partnership as under theory of conflict; and for providing insight into problems like that of limiting war, there is merit in using words that bring out the common interest of the adversaries and the “bargaining process” involved in the military maneuvers themselves. As will be seen in Chapter 9, even the problem of surprise attack is logically equivalent to a problem in partnership discipline. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 738

Categorization

  • XREF: Reinforces the reader’s framework that mafia-victim relations are a partnership (Arbitration, protection) with adversarial features, not pure conflict. — connects to: Conflict and partnership-distrust situations share one identical game structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 463; Adversaries in indeterminate games mutually construct the norms that govern their conflict — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 379; Co-presence can be unilateral, breaking presumed reciprocity between combatants (+3 more)

Broader Connections