Hostages and shared vulnerability render agreements self-enforcing

Evidence

The institution of hostages is an ancient technique that deserves to be studied by game theory, as does the practice of drinking wine from the same glass or of holding gang meetings in places so public that neither side could escape if it subjected the other to a massacre. The reported use of only drug addicts as agents or employees in a narcotics ring is a fairly straightforward example of a unilateral hostage. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 313

Categorization

• XREF: Schelling here anticipates Gambetta’s entire hostage-logic account of mafia trust — the Godfather-bond in Puzo operates exactly as this ‘mutual hostage’ device. — connects to: Mutual nuclear deterrence is a modern form of hostage exchange. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 545; Crisis agreements require both a stable solution pattern and verifiable, cheat-proof monitoring — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 575; Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 40 (+9 more)
• SEED: A direct hook for the planned analysis: Schelling formalizes what Gambetta later names — the hostage as the underlying economics of the Corleone bond.

Related

• Mutual nuclear deterrence is a modern form of hostage exchange. (similarity 0.83)
• Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points (similarity 0.82)
• Agreements stay enforceable through the shadow of future bargains (similarity 0.81)
• Enforcing one’s own promises requires a supporting legal or information structure (similarity 0.79)
• Common knowledge of mutual confidence makes a focal point self-sustaining (similarity 0.79)
• Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo (similarity 0.79)
• Thomas C. Schelling — The Strategy of Conflict (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion #exemplifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722
• Establishing identity and a communication line creates new exploitable threat value #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 326
• Trust relationships self-maintain once the parties recognize mutual benefit #corroborates (0.75)
• Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points #corroborates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 312
• Pervasive distrust is stable because solo cooperation invites exploitation #complicates (0.72)
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #corroborates (0.72)
• Trust cannot be demanded but only offered through vulnerability #expands (0.72)