Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears

Evidence

Even a player whose own probability of “irrational” attack is known to be zero must consider that the second may attack not only irrationally but also out of fear that the first, fearing the second’s attack, may try to strike first to forestall it. Thus it does seem as though we might get a compounding of motives. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 471

Categorization

• QUESTION: Worth chasing: does full visibility of the other’s true restraint parameter ever actually defuse the amplification, or is the zero-probability case itself unrealizable in general?
• XREF: connects to: One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787; Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347; Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 361 (+2 more)

Related

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.87)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.85)
• Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone (similarity 0.84)
• Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication. (similarity 0.82)
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. (similarity 0.81)
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.81)
• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert (similarity 0.80)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.80)
• First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals. (similarity 0.79)
• Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops. (similarity 0.79)
• Known capability for failure can stabilize mutual-threat situations (similarity 0.79)
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.79)
• A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787
• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 361
• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 461
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347