First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals.

Evidence

The “equalizer” of the Old West made it possible for either man to kill the other; it did not assure that both would be killed. The tense consequences of this weapon system can be seen on TV almost any night. The advantage of shooting first aggravates any incentive to shoot. As the survivor might put it, “He was about to kill me in self-defense, so I had to kill him in self-defense.” Or, “He, thinking I was about to kill him in self-defense, was about to kill me in self-defense, so I had to kill him in self-defense.” But if both were assured of living long enough to shoot back with unimpaired aim, there would be no advantage in jumping the gun and little reason to fear that the other would try it. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 530

Categorization

• XREF: The recursive self-defense spiral is the textbook escalation game — directly parallels Gambetta’s account of how mistrust feeds preemption in protection markets. — connects to: Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 461; Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491; Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 547 (+2 more)
• CANDY: The recursive ‘he was about to kill me in self-defense’ chain is a perfectly quotable framing of escalation.

Related

• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert (similarity 0.85)
• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.84)
• Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. (similarity 0.83)
• Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone (similarity 0.80)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.79)
• Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops. (similarity 0.79)
• Weapon evolution and deterrence form a self-accelerating spiral. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Weapons designed for first strike destabilize deterrence by inviting preemption. #expands (0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 547
• Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone #expands (0.88) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 462
• Weapon evolution and deterrence form a self-accelerating spiral. #expands (0.80) — Emlen, Douglas J, Animal Weapons_ The Evolution of Battle, 390