Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert
Evidence
If I go downstairs to investigate a noise at night, with a gun in my hand, and find myself face to face with a burglar who has a gun in his hand, there is danger of an outcome that neither of us desires. Even if he prefers just to leave quietly, and I wish him to, there is danger that he may think I want to shoot, and shoot first. Worse, there is danger that he may think that I think he wants to shoot. Or he may think that I think he thinks I want to shoot. And so on. “Self-defense” is ambiguous, when one is only trying to preclude being shot in self-defense. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 461
Categorization
- XREF: Directly instantiates the reader’s stated framework: Schellingian credible commitments and the hostage/first-strike mechanics the reader is mapping onto Gambetta and Milgrom. — connects to: Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491; First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 530; Publicly known reluctance to strike first paradoxically deters the enemy. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 525 (+3 more)
- DEFINE: Defines preclusive self-defense precisely through the infinite regress of ‘he thinks I think.‘
Related
- First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals. (similarity 0.85)
- Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.83)
- Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone (similarity 0.82)
- Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.80)
- Publicly known reluctance to strike first paradoxically deters the enemy. (similarity 0.80)
- Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication. (similarity 0.80)
- Rational actors need not calculate beyond first-order attack likelihoods. (similarity 0.80)
Broader Connections
- First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals.
#expands(0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 530 - Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491 - Publicly known reluctance to strike first paradoxically deters the enemy.
#contradicts(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 525