Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops.

Evidence

But a different situation obtains if I shoot not by calculation but by nervousness. Suppose that my nervousness depends on how frightened I am, and my fright depends on how likely I think it that he may shoot me; and suppose he acts the same way. Then when I consider the exogenous probability that he may shoot me out of sheer preference, it makes me nervous; this nervousness enhances the likelihood that I may shoot him even though I prefer not to. He sees my nervousness and gets nervous himself; that scares me more, and I am even more likely to shoot. He sees this increment in my nervousness, and matches it with one of his own, scaring me further; and the probability that I will shoot goes up again. Now we can denote each person’s nervousness as a function of the other’s, and the likelihood of shooting as a function of nervousness, and have a simple pair of simultaneous differential equations that seem to yield precisely the kind of phenomenon we started off to study. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 485

Categorization

• XREF: This is the escalation/arms-race feedback model that recurs throughout the book; connects to the spiral-of-suspicions theme in earlier chapters and to Tversky/Kahneman-style framing of reactive fear. — connects to: Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444; Collective fears can reshape group behavior in ambiguous situations. — Cohen, Stanley, Folk devils and moral panics: the…, 647; Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491 (+7 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The exogenous-vs-endogenous distinction — the whole class of strategy problems that genuinely produce spirals versus those that are all-or-none based on baseline probabilities — is a genuinely dense analytical pivot.
• QUESTION: How does this nervousness-feedback model square with the all-or-none conclusion in 483-484? Schelling seems to be flagging a real distinction worth chasing.

Related

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.85)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.79)
• First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals. (similarity 0.79)
• Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking #exemplifies (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491
• Known capability for failure can stabilize mutual-threat situations #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 822
• Collective fears can reshape group behavior in ambiguous situations. #expands (0.75) — Cohen, Stanley, Folk devils and moral panics, 647
• Mutually perceived signals explain the pull of psychologically dominant equilibria. #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 874
• Aversive behavioral interventions suppress behavior locally but fail to transfer and cause escalation #corroborates (0.72) — , The Rod and the Child, 7424
• Trusting action increases one’s vulnerability to another whose behavior is uncontrolled #complicates (0.72)
• Mutual invulnerability raises the credibility of limited retaliation #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 585
• Fear can trap individuals in hopeless situations. #exemplifies (0.70) — Leo Tolstoy, A Confession, 53