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🪵 The Threshold

Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly

Properties2
tagsja-picks, define, definitional_content, trade, singleton, xref, category/definitional-content
aliases@schelling_strategy_1960, loc. 30

2 min read

Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly

Evidence

A deterrent threat meets this definition nicely; it works only because of what the other player expects us to do in response to his choice of moves, and we can afford to make the threat only because we expect it to have an influence on his choice. But in international strategy the promise of game theory is so far unfulfilled. Game theory has been extremely helpful in the formulation of problems and the clarification of concepts, but its greatest successes have been in other fields. It has, on the whole, been pitched at a level of abstraction where it has made little contact with the elements of a problem like deterrence. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines games of ‘strategy’ as situations where the best course depends on expectations of other participants — the definitional core for the whole book.
  • XREF: connects to: Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460; Rational actors need not calculate beyond first-order attack likelihoods. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 484; Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 284 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

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