Simulation governs deterrence better than actual catastrophe does

Evidence

So, it is simulation that is effective, never the real. The simulation of nuclear catastrophe is the strategic result of this generic and universal undertaking of deterrence: accustoming the people to the ideology and the discipline of absolute security - to the metaphysics of fission and fissure. To this end the fissure must be a fiction. A real catastrophe would delay things, it would constitute a retrograde incident, of the explosive kind (without changing the course of things: did Hiroshima perceptibly delay, deter, the universal process of deterrence?). — Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 190

Categorization

• XREF: Directly opposes Jameson’s reading where the postmodern image or event retains a referential relation to late capital; Baudrillard here insists the real never gets its turn. Also connects to his precession of simulacra thesis. — connects to: Power cannot punish simulation because law itself is only a second-order simulacrum — Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 78; Simulation threatens power more than real transgression by attacking the reality principle itself — Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 74; Power reverses strategies when the threat shifts from the real to simulation — Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 84 (+7 more)
• DEFINE: Frames deterrence as a regime where catastrophe is suspended and simulated rather than produced.

Broader Connections

• Low-probability high-consequence risks inflate fear and enable extreme policies #corroborates (0.80) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 2115
• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460
• Deterrence theory lacks evidence for effective prediction #qualifies (0.75)
• Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444
• Confounding social factors undermine cross-state and time-series deterrence studies #complicates (0.75) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 1945
• Simulation games can model real-world environmental and geopolitical tradeoffs #expands (0.70)
• Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly #expands (0.70) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30