Rational actors need not calculate beyond first-order attack likelihoods.

Evidence

The same seems to be true now if we go back to that burglar downstairs. If he behaves “rationally” as defined in our behavior hypothesis above, he must consider the likelihood that I will shoot him out of sheer preference; and he must consider that I may shoot him if I think there is a strong likelihood that he will shoot me out of sheer preference. But, if we both know what these two basic (exogenous) “likelihoods” are, we need not go any further. Either these basic probabilities are sufficient to make at least one of us shoot to forestall surprise, and hence to make both shoot, so that the second and higher degree fears are superfluous, or else they are insufficient by themselves to make either of us shoot in self-defense, and we know it and have nothing to fear beyond the exogenous likelihoods themselves. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 484

Categorization

• XREF: Recurs to the burglar analogy from earlier chapters; anchors the escalation-due-to-irrationality vs rational-all-or-none distinction in a concrete domestic scene. — connects to: Optimal action under ideal assumptions can be useless under real conditions — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 1033; Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460; Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30
• SHARE: The ‘burglar downstairs’ framing of the game-theoretic spiral is a compact illustration for anyone interested in Schelling or deterrence theory.

Related

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.80)
• Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly (similarity 0.80)
• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.80)
• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert (similarity 0.80)
• Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460
• Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30
• Optimal action under ideal assumptions can be useless under real conditions #qualifies (0.72) — Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem, 1033