Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible

Evidence

The use of thugs and sadists for the collection of extortion or the guarding of prisoners, or the conspicuous delegation of authority to a military commander of known motivation, exemplifies a common means of making credible a response pattern that the original source of decision might have been thought to shrink from or to find profitless, once the threat had failed. (Just as it would be rational for a rational player to destroy his own rationality in certain game situations, either to deter a threat that might be made against him and that would be premised on his rationality or to make credible a threat that he could not otherwise commit himself to, it may also be rational for a player to select irrational partners or agents.) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 332

Categorization

• XREF: Explains why a Mafia boss courts ‘irrational’ violence and revenge-honor norms — they are the commitment device that makes private enforcement credible in ways a rational state would shrink from. — connects to: Obscure symbolic threats minimize exposure while maximizing terror; Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 801; Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23 (+5 more)

Related

• Delegating decisions to agents makes threats more credible (similarity 0.81)
• Obscure symbolic threats minimize exposure while maximizing terror (similarity 0.81)
• Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents (similarity 0.80)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat (similarity 0.79)
• Credible threats must attach penalties to observable acts, not intentions (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Institutional reputation makes threats more credible than individual threats #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 80
• Credible threats can be conveyed by action rather than verbal pledge #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 34