Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation.

Evidence

This, I believed, meant either that certain propositions of constitutional law functioned as modalities, determining the truth of other propositions, but were themselves indeterminable as to this truth, or that some external structure validated these propositions. If it was the former, then their legitimacy derived from their use alone, and from nothing else. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate and to legal positivism vs. natural law debates. — connects to: Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48; Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15; Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437 (+7 more)

Related

• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction (similarity 0.94)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.91)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.87)
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. (similarity 0.87)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.86)
• Legitimacy is better understood as contingency control than as justification or consent. (similarity 0.86)
• Classical constitutional puzzles reduce fundamentally to questions of legitimacy and legitimation. (similarity 0.84)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.83)
• Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. (similarity 0.82)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.82)
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. (similarity 0.82)
• A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions. (similarity 0.81)
• Any external normativity contaminates practice-derived legitimation entirely. (similarity 0.80)
• Both law’s traditionalists and its critics assume legitimacy requires determinate maxims (similarity 0.79)
• Legal propositions are true when they invite competent professional assent. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval #corroborates (0.90) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437
• Legitimacy and physical force are symbolically interlinked, not opposites #expands (0.82) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 717
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. #expands (0.75) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms #expands (0.70) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 438
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. #expands (0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 451
• Common law legitimacy derives from published judicial opinions and public reasoning. #responds-to (0.55) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 115
• Establishment of legal succession requires an accepted rule rather than mere habit #corroborates (0.50) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 661