Leaving a final standing offer is a winning commitment tactic.

Evidence

To illustrate, suppose in the earlier cooperative game there is a turnstile that permits a player to leave but not to return; his current offer as he goes through the turnstile remains on the books until the bell rings. Now we have a means by which a player can make a “final” offer, a “commitment”; whoever can record an offer favorable to himself and known to the other, and leave the room, has the winning tactic. Of course it may win for either of them; but this may mean that we end up with something like a foot race, and the one closest to the turnstile wins. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 636

Categorization

• XREF: Directly models Schelling-style commitment mechanics (Godfather-bonds as credible commitments in Mafia arbitration) — the reader’s stated analytical frame. — connects to: Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 353; Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289; First-mover advantage decides bargaining when commitments are costless and binding — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 69

Related

• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.86)
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game (similarity 0.85)
• First-mover advantage decides bargaining when commitments are costless and binding (similarity 0.82)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.80)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 353
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289
• First-mover advantage decides bargaining when commitments are costless and binding #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 69