Players win only by drawing a division line both can anticipate identically
Evidence
One player is “located” in Cincinnati, the other in San Francisco; they have identical maps of the United States and are to divide the country between them. Each is to draw a line dividing the United States into two parts; the line may be straight or curved, related or unrelated to physical or political landmarks. If the two of them divide the map differently, neither gets anything; but if they draw identical division lines on their maps, they are both rewarded. The reward for each player depends on what is contained in his piece after the division, that is, the piece that contains the city in which he is located. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 234
Categorization
- DEFINE: A worked example giving concrete form to the tacit coordination game where communication and sequential moves are absent.
- XREF: connects to: Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 653; In coordination, neither player can outsmart the other without outsmarting himself — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 235; Mathematical solutions only focus expectations when players perceive each other as mathematicians — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 272 (+1 more)
Related
- In coordination, neither player can outsmart the other without outsmarting himself (similarity 0.83)
- Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.79)
- Any coordinated expectation is rational regardless of how the players arrived at it (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Mixed strategies primarily prevent the opponent’s anticipation of one’s choice.
#complicates(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 800 - Mathematical solutions only focus expectations when players perceive each other as mathematicians
#expands(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 272