Scholars treat legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as unrelated despite functional similarities

Evidence

In sum, the existing picture of political entrenchment in public law is both partial and internally inconsistent. Courts and scholars have maintained an oddly myopic focus on entrenchment strategies that operate through explicit legal rules aimed at processes of political change, while turning a blind, or at least uncritical, eye to the vastly more expansive domain of political entrenchment. And even within that limited field of vision, public law has regarded legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as distinct and self-contained phenomena, ignoring both their functional and normative similarities. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 34

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Scholarship fails to see functional entrenchment as equal in democratic stakes to formal entrenchment — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 26; Theorists split on whether constitutional and legislative entrenchment are normatively equivalent. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 448; Electoral and legislative entrenchment form one larger insulating phenomenon — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 41 (+5 more)

Broader Connections