Electoral entrenchment has two distinct forms requiring distinct review.

Evidence

For example, Michael Klarman argues that courts should commit themselves to policing the dual entrenchment problems of representatives perpetuating their hold on office by acting contrary to the wishes of their constituents and temporary political majorities seeking to extend their hold on power into the future. To this end, Klarman develops a framework for “anti-entrenchment review” of districting, disfranchisement, ballot access restrictions, campaign finance reform, and other areas of election law. Klarman’s approach is motivated by an overarching commitment to the democratic value of majority rule, which he sees as threatened whenever officials contradict the preferences of a majority of citizens or when the will of a present majority is thwarted by entrenched arrangements. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 117

Categorization

• DEFINE: Klarman’s two-type taxonomy of entrenchment — incumbent self-perpetuation vs. present-majority lock-in — is a useful analytic distinction underlying the whole book.
• XREF: connects to: Electoral and legislative entrenchment form one larger insulating phenomenon — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 41; Scholars treat legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as unrelated despite functional similarities — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 34; Electoral rules have long served partisan entrenchment across American history — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 83

Broader Connections

• Scholars treat legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as unrelated despite functional similarities #expands (0.82) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 34
• Electoral rules have long served partisan entrenchment across American history #exemplifies (0.80) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 83