Formal-versus-functional entrenchment does not split cleanly into bad and good

Evidence

A robust normative theory for sorting socially beneficial versus harmful types of entrenchment would have to be combined with a well-developed empirical sense, or prediction, of the distribution of these various kinds. But there is no reason to believe that these lines would break along a simplistic division between formal and functional entrenchment. If public law theorists who selectively condemn electoral and legislative entrenchment are conducting categorical cost-benefit calculations along these lines, they have never shown their work. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 443

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s broader theory work on institutional persistence since it challenges a convenient formal/functional dichotomy that could otherwise serve as a shortcut explaining why some ideologies persist and others don’t. — connects to: Scholarship fails to see functional entrenchment as equal in democratic stakes to formal entrenchment — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 26; Entrenchment carries both benefits and costs depending on context — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 509; Functional entrenchment can be legitimate when it insulates sound policies against short-term reversal — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 393 (+1 more)
• QUESTION: If formal versus functional entrenchment doesn’t track harm, what actually predicts which entrenched ideological content becomes durable-sticky versus discarded — the reader’s central question remains open here.
• DEFINE: Distinguishes ‘formal entrenchment’ as the concept under scrutiny in this book from merely rhetorical ideology, and raises ‘functional entrenchment’ as a parallel category.

Broader Connections

• Formal and functional entrenchment do not differ in harm or benefit #corroborates (0.95)