Entrenchment can serve public-regarding precommitment, not only self-dealing.

Evidence

Public law has primarily focused on entrenchment as an intentional strategy, and most of the examples we discuss are of this sort. The intentionality of entrenchment is often associated with bad motives, as when parties and politicians engage in self-serving efforts to suppress competition and maintain their hold on power. But intentional entrenchment need not be self-serving. As the literature on constitutionalism emphasizes, there are perfectly respectable, public-regarding reasons for entrenchment. Constitutions, in common with other mechanisms of entrenchment, facilitate enduring political commitments (or “precommitments”), protecting normatively preferred policies from being undermined by shortsighted or otherwise pathological decision making. Constitutional and other forms of entrenchment also promote political coordination and stability, reducing the costs of both conflict and transition. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 71

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes intentional self-serving entrenchment from precommitment-based entrenchment.
• XREF: Precommitment framing echoes the reader’s interest in durable ideologically-embedded institutions and their public-rationale veneer. — connects to: Entrenchment can serve public ends like precommitment and stability, not just self-serving power; Entrenchment carries both benefits and costs depending on context — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 509; Entrenchment also works by relocating decision authority to insulated actors — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 325
• ADDENDUM: Precommitment as a stability mechanism is broadly relevant to institutional-persistence work, though not tied to a specific prior article.

Broader Connections

• Entrenchment can serve public ends like precommitment and stability, not just self-serving power #corroborates (1.00)
• Entrenchment also works by relocating decision authority to insulated actors #expands (0.78) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 325
• Entrenchment carries both benefits and costs depending on context #qualifies (0.72) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 509