Theorists split on whether constitutional and legislative entrenchment are normatively equivalent.

Evidence

Not surprisingly, then, some theorists have viewed constitutional and subconstitutional entrenchment as normative equivalents—equally bad, or equally not bad. Klarman takes the former view, emphasizing that constitutional entrenchment shares the democratic pathologies of electoral and legislative entrenchment, and viewing all as equally suspect. Posner and Vermeule take the opposite view, pointing to the parallels with constitutional entrenchment as an argument for treating legislative entrenchment as no less pernicious or permissible. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 448

Categorization

• XREF: Posner/Vermeule and Klarman positions map onto the reader’s schema of ideology persistence debates — where theorists align ideological commitments to entrenchment levels. — connects to: Scholars treat legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as unrelated despite functional similarities — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 34; Constitutional and subconstitutional rules entrench through the same mechanisms — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 478; Scholarship fails to see functional entrenchment as equal in democratic stakes to formal entrenchment — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 26 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Constitutions entrench policies through structure and rights much as legislation and elections do #corroborates (0.88) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 462
• Scholarship fails to see functional entrenchment as equal in democratic stakes to formal entrenchment #expands (0.86) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 26
• Constitutional and subconstitutional rules entrench through the same mechanisms #corroborates (0.82) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 478
• Ordinary statutes can carry quasi-constitutional entrenchment power #exemplifies (0.78) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 463
• Constitutional entrenchment is real only where not subject to judicial or interpretive change #qualifies (0.74) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 464