Formal and functional entrenchment are broadly substitutable in effect and moral valence.

Evidence

In short, entrenchment can be used for good as well as for ill. But—and here is the crucial point—this goes for formal as well as functional entrenchment. An unamendable statutory formula could replace the delegated authority of the Federal Reserve as a means of locking in sound monetary policy. If stringent environmental regulation will provide long-term benefits in preventing climate change, those benefits could also be achieved through legislative entrenchment, or perhaps alternatively by tilting the electoral playing field in favor of liberal Democrats. … In sum, there is nothing about the distinction between formal and functional entrenchment that would appear to correlate with social harms or benefits. Both can be motivated by the narrow political self-interest of parties, politicians, and interest groups; or, alternatively, by broader, public-regarding motivations. And both can be used to accomplish the same outcomes, insulating officeholders and policies against downstream majorities with different preferences. Given the broad substitutability of formal and functional entrenchment mechanisms, there is no reason to believe that one would be categorically more harmful (or beneficial) than the other. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 399

Categorization

• XREF: Directly serves the reader’s question about when rationalizing ideologies embedded in law versus rhetoric are legitimate versus harmful. — connects to: Formal and functional entrenchment do not differ in harm or benefit; Entrenchment can be functional, via empowered constituencies, not only formal legal rules — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 370
• QUESTION: If formal vs. functional entrenchment doesn’t track harm, what does? This opens the reader’s core question about the ideology-content rather than the mechanism.

Broader Connections

• Formal and functional entrenchment do not differ in harm or benefit #corroborates (0.95)
• Entrenchment can be functional, via empowered constituencies, not only formal legal rules #expands (0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 370