Constitutional and subconstitutional rules entrench through the same mechanisms

Evidence

Indeed, from a functional perspective, it becomes difficult to see any clear distinction between political entrenchment at the constitutional and subconstitutional levels. As theorists of the small-c constitution recognize, and as we have emphasized here, many subconstitutional rules and arrangements are at least as entrenched as many constitutional norms (in addition to sharing other indicia of constitutionality, like heightened democratic support or structural significance). And many formally constitutional rules and rights seem not to be especially entrenched against functional change. Rather than viewing constitutional entrenchment as a separate and superior category, public law scholars might do better to recognize the continuity of political entrenchment at the constitutional and subconstitutional levels. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 478

Categorization

• XREF: Challenges the formalist presumption the reader is implicitly testing — that ‘embedded in law’ (constitutional level) versus rhetoric (subconstitutional) is the decisive durability axis. — connects to: Scholars treat legislative, electoral, and constitutional entrenchment as unrelated despite functional similarities — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 34; Theorists split on whether constitutional and legislative entrenchment are normatively equivalent. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 448; Constitutions entrench policies through structure and rights much as legislation and elections do — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 462 (+6 more)
• SEED: An essay angle: functional entrenchment theory suggests ideology stickiness is a property of constituency alignment, not of formal legal category — test against cases where formally entrenched rules got discarded and informal ones persisted.

Broader Connections

• Political actors entrench power through functional mechanisms as readily as formal legal rules #corroborates (0.88) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 42
• Legal entrenchment always depends on political entrenchment of the rules #qualifies (0.82) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 187
• Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules #expands (0.80) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173
• Structural constitutional rules resist change despite eroding functional justification #corroborates (0.78)