Ordinary statutes can carry quasi-constitutional entrenchment power

Evidence

At the same time, as we have seen, other theorists view the special democratic pedigree of statutes like the Civil Rights Act as markers of quasi-constitutional status. The functional lesson here is that (formal) constitutional law does not have a monopoly over the entrenchment of structural arrangements or of the fruits of higher-order democratic politics. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 463

Categorization

• XREF: Supports the reader’s thesis that ideological stickiness can attach to statutory regimes (e.g. Civil Rights Act) without formal constitutional status. — connects to: Theorists split on whether constitutional and legislative entrenchment are normatively equivalent. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 448; Constitutional entrenchment is real only where not subject to judicial or interpretive change — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 464; Constitutions entrench policies through structure and rights much as legislation and elections do — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 462 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• Entrenchment can be functional, via empowered constituencies, not only formal legal rules #corroborates (0.92) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 370
• Political barriers can entrench laws as effectively as formal constitutional impediments do. #corroborates (0.90) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 184
• Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules #expands (0.88) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173
• Framework statutes entrench policy through political costs rather than legal prohibitions. #expands (0.87) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 192
• Constitutional and subconstitutional rules entrench through the same mechanisms #expands (0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 478
• Legal entrenchment always depends on political entrenchment of the rules #qualifies (0.78) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 187
• Constitutional designers protect property from majority rule using supermajorities and courts #qualifies (0.74) — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 186