Political actors entrench power through functional mechanisms as readily as formal legal rules
Evidence
Electoral and legislative entrenchment (as well as constitutional entrenchment) are created by means of formal legal rules governing processes of political change—the rules governing voting and elections, the enactment or repeal of legislation, and constitutional adoption and amendment. Yet, as Part II describes, politicians, parties, and policies can be entrenched through functional, political mechanisms just as readily as through formal, legal ones. Developing and drawing upon a wide range of examples, this Part synthesizes three general mechanisms of functional entrenchment. First, politicians, parties, and temporarily prevailing coalitions can enact substantive policies that strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents. Second, they can enact policies or programs that change the composition of the political community, selecting in allies or selecting out opponents. Third, they can shift the locus of political decision making to an actor or institution that is responsive to allies or unresponsive to opponents. These functional strategies appear to be close substitutes for formal electoral, legislative, and constitutional entrenchment, and there is every reason to believe they are widely used by political actors to accomplish the same ends. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 42
Categorization
- DEFINE: Defines ‘functional entrenchment’ against formal legal entrenchment and lays out its three mechanisms.
- XREF: Directly serves the reader’s core question on how embedded rationalizing ideologies persist; connects to path dependence and institutional persistence frameworks. — connects to: Political actors insulate favored policies by refashioning institutional context across many domains — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 25; Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173; Political entrenchment operates through informal and coercive means, not only formal legal rules — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 48 (+10 more)
Broader Connections
- Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules
#expands(0.95) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173 - Entrenchment can be functional, via empowered constituencies, not only formal legal rules
#exemplifies(0.93) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 370 - Political entrenchment operates through informal and coercive means, not only formal legal rules
#corroborates(0.88) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 48 - Constitutions entrench policies through structure and rights much as legislation and elections do
#expands(0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 462 - Legal entrenchment always depends on political entrenchment of the rules
#qualifies(0.80) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 187 - Power operates through indirect, non-conflictual channels hidden below manifest conflict
#exemplifies(0.75) — Walter Korpi, The Iceberg of Power below the Surface, 4 - Identity-based actions can reshape political power structures without being intended as political
#exemplifies(0.72) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4416 - Rights function as instruments of governance, not just limits on power
#qualifies(0.70)