Human moral behavior may originate in mere conformity to convention, not genuine morality.

Evidence

In truth, to address the basic question raised by the target article (“What makes humans moral beings?”) is to resolve the problem of how one transcends mere conventionality. Indeed, one could argue that mutualism does not either derive from, or give rise to, morality. Instead, it might simply derive from, or give rise to, a sense of convention. In this “conventionalist” account, it is not morality proper that would be linked to mutualism but conventionality or the sense, perception, and ultimately submission of individuals to the recognition of collective ways of being. The product of natural selection would be conformists rather than moralists. In this account, moral values would derive from conventions, and this is evident by looking at children in their development. … Abundant research shows that children are born first conventional and slowly develop to become autonomous moral agents (see the studies done by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg). What infants are born with is a sensitivity for how things appear to be done in their social surroundings. Very early on, infants detect patterns in the way people behave with one another and react with surprise when these patterns are transgressed. For example, young infants detect when a protagonist hinders rather than helps another, or defies expected physical dominance (Hamlin et al. 2007; Thomsen et al. 2011). This, we would argue, can all be derived from majority patterns of social interactions, eventually becoming perceived norms that can be uncannily transgressed. We would be hard pressed to equate such responses with morality or fairness proper. To become moral, such responses and implicit norms need to be re-described by each child in his or her development. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 541

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes ‘conventionality’ (submission to collective ways of being) from ‘morality proper’ — a useful conceptual distinction.
• XREF: Connects to the reading purpose: Rodrigues’ obedience in Silence could be read as submission to convention rather than genuine moral autonomy. — connects to: People feel moral obligations they never actually agreed to. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 460; Internalized norms arise from pragmatic habits mistakenly moralized as duties.; Morality resembles a self-enforcing contract between present and future selves. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 231 (+3 more)

Related

• People feel moral obligations they never actually agreed to. (similarity 0.82)
• Morality serves a self-directed ego function of constructing moral identity. (similarity 0.81)
• Human morality may rest on a general normativizing capacity, not a dedicated fairness module. (similarity 0.80)
• Moral obligations require overriding force that natural selection doesn’t explain (similarity 0.79)
• Conventions are consensual and vary culturally, whereas morality concerns harm and rights (similarity 0.79)
• Moral consistency can be learned rule-following rather than an innate disposition (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Internalized norms arise from pragmatic habits mistakenly moralized as duties. #corroborates (0.88)
• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #complicates (0.80) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356
• Morality resembles a self-enforcing contract between present and future selves. #complicates (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 231
• Received moral imperatives often mask what we actually care about. #corroborates (0.72) — Janet Burroway; Elizabeth Stuckey-French; Ned Stuckey-French, Writing Fiction, Tenth Edition, 64