Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion.
Evidence
Punishment is often seen as a fundamental way to sustain cooperation. In a mutualistic framework, however, the competition among partners for participation in cooperative ventures is supposed to be strong enough to select cooperative and indeed moral dispositions (Barclay 2004 2006; Barclay & Willer 2007; Chiang 2010; Coricelli et al. 2004; Ehrhart & Keser 1999; Hardy & Van Vugt 2006; Page et al. 2005; Sheldon et al. 2000; Sylwester & Roberts 2010). Uncooperative individuals are not made to cooperate by being punished. Rather, they are excluded from cooperative ventures (an exclusion that is harming to them, and in that sense, can be seen a form of “punishment,” but that is not aimed at, and does not have the function of, forcing them to cooperate). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 173
Categorization
- XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s analytical framework: the Japanese authorities’ fumi-e ritual is a coercive punishment aimed at forcing cooperation, contrasted here with the mutualistic logic of exclusion from cooperative ventures — a key tension in understanding Rodrigues’ position. — connects to: Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 28; Altruistic cooperators still choose partners they trust and cooperate only where reciprocation is possible. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 410; Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 593 (+6 more)
- DEFINE: Clarifies the mutualistic alternative to punishment as the enforcement mechanism for cooperation: the threat of exclusion, not deterrence through harm.
Related
- Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. (similarity 0.87)
- Explaining how cooperative groups formed requires enforcement mechanisms, not just expulsion of the asocial. (similarity 0.82)
- Costly punishment sustains cooperation that otherwise decays over repeated rounds. (similarity 0.81)
- Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. (similarity 0.80)
- Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.80)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.80)
- Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Explaining how cooperative groups formed requires enforcement mechanisms, not just expulsion of the asocial.
#contradicts(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 281 - Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members
#contradicts(0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808 - Group solidarity and in-group favoritism derive from mutualistic relationships, not independent moral rules.
#corroborates(0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 705 - Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection.
#corroborates(0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 605