Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries.

Evidence

Second, they conflate constitutional argument (an activity confined to those persons whose decisions must be explained in terms of legal argument) with constitutional discourse (an activity that takes up the same subjects, and which may include legal argument, but which, though constrained by its own modalities of argument, is not confined to legal argument). — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409

Categorization

• DEFINE: Distinguishes constitutional argument from the broader constitutional discourse it sits within.
• XREF: connects to: Legislative intent and statutory purpose are conceptually distinct and often conflated — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 293; I further believed that journalists, and citizens generally, could make use of these forms of legal argument, although they were not confined to legal argument in making constitutional decisions as were government officials. The constitutional discourse of which the people were an essential part could be enriched by legal argument, and judicial decisions need not be either ignored or passively accepted.; Constitutional interpretation and constitutional discourse are distinct practices. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 767 (+5 more)

Related

• Constitutional interpretation and constitutional discourse are distinct practices. (similarity 0.94)
• I further believed that journalists, and citizens generally, could make use of these forms of legal argument, although they were not confined to legal argument in making constitutional decisions… (similarity 0.90)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.89)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.85)
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. (similarity 0.84)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.84)
• Constitutional law and jurisprudence need have only contingent historical connections. (similarity 0.83)
• For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… (similarity 0.83)
• A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions. (similarity 0.82)
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. (similarity 0.80)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.79)
• US constitutional argument forms derive from common-law modes overlaid on the state. (similarity 0.79)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.79)
• It is true that, in my law classes, I spend a good deal of time with students practicing various kinds of argument. Every professor does this-every one must, although perhaps usually less… (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• As he does with Wittgenstein, Winter intends to indict me for the particularist fallacy and for practice fetishism, though in my case it is not because I am a behaviorist, but because I am a… #exemplifies (0.80)
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. #corroborates (0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval #expands (0.45) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. #corroborates (0.40) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 451