Constitutional law and jurisprudence need have only contingent historical connections.

Evidence

Constitutional Interpretation concerns the relationship between constitutional law and jurisprudence. The standard view is that the latter determines the former. 3 The revisionist view is that the former determines the latter.’ I wish to sever any necessary-any but the contingent-historical connection between the two. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 884

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to debates about law’s autonomy from theory, similar to arguments in legal realism and Duncan Kennedy’s work. — connects to: Historical practice by the First Congress reveals constitutional meaning beyond pattern alone — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1070; Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 409; When I began writing Constitutional Interpretation, constitutional criticism (and jurisprudence) reflected the universalist ideals of empiricism and scarcely questioned the premises of autonomous human reason (if only on the part of the analyst), which were taken as unproblematic, indeed axiomatic. Since then, many movements have sprung up in the law schools that renounce such an epistemology, especially the hermeneuticist and the communitarian movements. I will say here only that there are many nonfoundationalist, nonrepresentationalist accounts one might give, and that these accounts may differ sharply, especially as to their prescriptive character. (+2 more)

Broader Connections