Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational.

Evidence

Where trust is involved, in Luhmann’s view, alternatives are consciously borne in mind by the individual in deciding to follow a particular course of action. Someone who buys a used car, instead of a new one, risks purchasing a dud. He or she places trust in the salesperson or the reputation of the firm to try to avoid this occurrence. Thus, an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of confidence, whereas someone who does recognise those alternatives and tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust. In a situation of confidence, a person reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in circumstances of trust she or he must partly shoulder the blame and may regret having placed trust in someone or something. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81; Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98; Trust is a three-part cognitive relation grounded in truth, not choice (+2 more)

Related

• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. (similarity 0.92)
• Luhmann distinguishes confidence in institutions from trust between persons (similarity 0.91)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk (similarity 0.90)
• Luhmannian confidence is blind trust akin to hope, not trust (similarity 0.89)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.86)
• Whether disappointment depends on one’s own behavior distinguishes trust from mere confidence (similarity 0.86)
• Trusting a government is not analogous to trusting another person. (similarity 0.85)
• Trust sits between faith and confidence on an evidence-affect continuum (similarity 0.84)
• Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.84)
• Survey ‘trust in government’ reduces to confidence, not interpersonal trust (similarity 0.84)
• Liberalism shifts expectations from confidence to trust but neglects the confidence that participation requires (similarity 0.84)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (similarity 0.84)
• Trust involves a calculable asymmetry of possible harm, while hope does not (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is domain-specific, varying by context and relationship rather than globally. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. #expands (0.85) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81
• Trust is a three-part cognitive relation grounded in truth, not choice #corroborates (0.80)
• Trust in rulers is a realistic assessment of irreversibility, not psychic compulsion #exemplifies (0.80)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose #corroborates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself #complicates (0.72)