Trust arguments often assume benign societies that may not exist

Evidence

In a relatively benign society, we can afford to take chances with people in general until we discover any of them not to be worthy of cooperation. If, in contrast, we had come to be distrusting in general, the result in a benign society would surely be far worse than what would follow from taking risks on people. Presumably, it would seem much more akin to much of international relations, as in the Cold War between East and West, in which distrust often seemed to be the baseline and trust to be an unreachable goal. Still, to be generally distrusting—or at least to fail to trust—would not be irrational or immoral in some contexts. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification; Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605; Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral (+3 more)

Related

• Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks (similarity 0.92)
• Misplaced trust costs far more than forgone trust, making distrust come more quickly (similarity 0.91)
• Justified distrust is benign and morally acceptable, not a social failing. (similarity 0.86)
• Universal trust can be rational in sufficiently benign worlds despite Luhmann (similarity 0.85)
• Generalized distrust is more rational than generalized trust. (similarity 0.83)
• Generalized trust is closer to expectation than to relationship-specific trust (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.82)
• Individual trust is not rational even where group-wide trust would benefit all (similarity 0.81)
• Citizens cannot trust government because they lack knowledge of its trustworthiness (similarity 0.81)
• Failed trust is answered with still more trust, not less. (similarity 0.81)
• Individual-level rational-choice accounts of trust fail as general explanations (similarity 0.81)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is domain-specific, varying by context and relationship rather than globally. (similarity 0.80)
• People are honest unless they have a reason not to be and believe others unless suspicion is triggered — the very thought of doubt ‘does not even come to mind’, so trust operates routinely… (similarity 0.80)
• Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Trust and distrust are each functional only in matching worlds #qualifies (0.88)
• Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks #qualifies (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605
• Distrust of government is easier to ground rationally than trust #expands (0.78)
• Justified distrust can be a moral act and so trust is not inherently moral #complicates (0.75)
• Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification #complicates (0.72)