Trust is a faith-like commitment, not mere cognitive calculation

Evidence

Trust exists, Simmel says, when we “believe in” someone or some principle: “It expresses the feeling that there exists between our idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain consistency in our conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the Ego to this conception, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is not explained by them.” Trust, in short, is a form of “faith,” in which the confidence vested in probable outcomes expresses a commitment to something rather than just a cognitive understanding. Indeed, and I shall elaborate upon this later on, the modes of trust involved in modern institutions in the nature of the case rest upon vague and partial understandings of their “knowledge base.” — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 73

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘surrender of the Ego’ to a conception directly parallels Stevens’s suppression of self; connects to the reader’s framing of total devotion as abnegation. Also echoes the faith-without-full-knowledge structure that the reader wants for the Luhmann link. — connects to: Trust is an attitude transferable to no other objects or people — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 155; Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 88; Giddens defines trust as confidence in the reliability of a person or system expressing faith in the probity or love of another or in the correctness of abstract principles, and notes all trust is in a sense blind trust. — Giddens on Trust (+15 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: This faith-as-commitment, resting on vague and partial understanding of the knowledge base, is precisely how institutional deference converts into abdication when the institution is morally ungrounded.

Related

• Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. (similarity 0.89)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.88)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (similarity 0.88)
• Giddens defines trust as confidence in the reliability of a person or system expressing faith in the probity or love of another or in the correctness of abstract principles, and notes all trust is… (similarity 0.88)
• All trust is blind trust, being the link between faith and confidence. (similarity 0.87)
• Trust is an attitude transferable to no other objects or people (similarity 0.84)
• Giddens describes how trust in abstract systems develops as ‘faceless commitments,’ yet notes relations of trust are always ambivalent because confidence is needed amid fundamental ignorance of… (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is willed action taken despite an information deficit. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust sits between faith and confidence on an evidence-affect continuum (similarity 0.82)
• Trust clues only reduce risk, never eliminate the leap of faith. (similarity 0.82)
• Trust in abstract systems is tacit routine, not conscious choice. (similarity 0.81)
• Normal modern trust is a pragmatic bargain mixing deference with scepticism. (similarity 0.81)
• Luhmannian confidence is blind trust akin to hope, not trust (similarity 0.81)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. #corroborates (0.90) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 88