Liberalism shifts expectations from confidence to trust but neglects the confidence that participation requires

Evidence

Where trust is involved, in Luhmann’s view, alternatives are consciously borne in mind by the individual in deciding to follow a particular course of action. Someone who buys a used car, instead of a new one, risks purchasing a dud. He or she places trust in the salesperson or the reputation of the firm to try to avoid this occurrence. Thus, an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of confidence, whereas someone who does recognise those alternatives and tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust. In a situation of confidence, a person reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in circumstances of trust she or he must partly shoulder the blame and may regret having placed trust in someone or something. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81 (#expands, via linked claim)

To give an account of trust in government on analogy with trust in individuals requires two classes of argument. First, we must give an account of the trustworthiness of government agents. Second, we must account for the knowledge citizens are likely to have of such trustworthiness. In the second account, the central problem is the translation of individual-to-individual relationships to individual-to-group or individual-to-institution relationships. What is called trust in government may in fact be something short of trust as we experience it in interpersonal relations. This is confidence, or what we might call quasi trust. It is based on reasons for believing government agents to be trustworthy, reasons that do not involve direct relationships with the quasi trusting citizen. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 703 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Trust in government is really quasi-trust or confidence, not trust — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 703; Participation in functional systems requires confidence rather than personal trust; Declining trust in government reflects trustworthiness, not citizen psychology — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 732 (+5 more)

Related

• Trusting a government is not analogous to trusting another person. (similarity 0.90)
• Survey ‘trust in government’ reduces to confidence, not interpersonal trust (similarity 0.88)
• Luhmann distinguishes confidence in institutions from trust between persons (similarity 0.86)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk (similarity 0.84)
• Trust in government is really quasi-trust or confidence, not trust (similarity 0.84)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.84)
• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. (similarity 0.83)
• Luhmannian confidence is blind trust akin to hope, not trust (similarity 0.83)
• Liberalism overestimates individual choice and neglects the baseline confidence systems require. (similarity 0.82)
• Ungrounded faith in government benefits the powerful, not the faithful (similarity 0.81)
• Governments cannot satisfy the encapsulated-interest account of trust. (similarity 0.80)
• Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.79)
• Trust is a policy for coping with uncertainty about others’ freedom. (similarity 0.79)
• Missing confidence saps diffuse sentiment while missing trust blocks decisive action. (similarity 0.79)
• Modernity’s trust requires the awareness that human activity is socially created, not divinely given. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Participation in functional systems requires confidence rather than personal trust #corroborates (0.90)
• Trust in government is really quasi-trust or confidence, not trust #expands (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 703
• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. #expands (0.85) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81
• Confidence and trust are not zero-sum but mutually required by complex societies #expands (0.80)
• Trust in officials can mean merely inductive expectation, losing positive valence #expands (0.78)
• Declining trust in government reflects trustworthiness, not citizen psychology #complicates (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 732
• Trust in government is not a major working factor in modern society #complicates (0.75)