Individual-level rational-choice accounts of trust fail as general explanations

Evidence

Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible a long sequence of future agreement. By the same token, “trust” may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance, if it can be divided into a succession of increments. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311 (#responds-to, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Dispositional trust theories explain only variation in risk-taking, not trust itself; Fine-grained discrimination of whom to trust limits the role of noncognitive trust.; Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311 (+7 more)

Related

• Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience (similarity 0.86)
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses (similarity 0.85)
• Trust is domain-specific, varying by context and relationship rather than globally. (similarity 0.84)
• Trustworthiness persists only while future gains from the relationship outweigh defection (similarity 0.83)
• Fine-grained discrimination of whom to trust limits the role of noncognitive trust. (similarity 0.83)
• Misplaced trust costs far more than forgone trust, making distrust come more quickly (similarity 0.83)
• Trust requires time for repeated interactions and is a cognitive capacity (similarity 0.82)
• Confidence is a self-fulfilling virtuous spiral unlike superstitious hope (similarity 0.82)
• Trust is not chosen, a gamble, or an investment; only actions are (similarity 0.82)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.82)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.82)
• Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks (similarity 0.82)
• Trusting always exceeds available evidence; reasons for trust are retrospective self-justification (similarity 0.82)
• Trust only arises where opportunistic behavior is genuinely possible (similarity 0.82)
• Rational trust requires both trusted’s incentives and truster’s knowledge (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Dispositional trust theories explain only variation in risk-taking, not trust itself #corroborates (0.85)
• Repeated-interaction gains let trust outweigh distrust despite occasional great losses #responds-to (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 311
• Self-fulfilling distrust becomes individually rational and resistant to disproof #corroborates (0.80)
• Trust is a three-part cognitive relation grounded in truth, not choice #corroborates (0.80)
• Trusting always exceeds available evidence; reasons for trust are retrospective self-justification #corroborates (0.80)
• Generalized distrust in a benign society costs more than misplaced risks #corroborates (0.78) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 605
• Fine-grained discrimination of whom to trust limits the role of noncognitive trust. #corroborates (0.75)
• Whether disappointment depends on one’s own behavior distinguishes trust from mere confidence #expands (0.75)
• Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification #corroborates (0.72)