Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not.

Evidence

Where trust is involved, in Luhmann’s view, alternatives are consciously borne in mind by the individual in deciding to follow a particular course of action. Someone who buys a used car, instead of a new one, risks purchasing a dud. He or she places trust in the salesperson or the reputation of the firm to try to avoid this occurrence. Thus, an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of confidence, whereas someone who does recognise those alternatives and tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust. In a situation of confidence, a person reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in circumstances of trust she or he must partly shoulder the blame and may regret having placed trust in someone or something. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81

Categorization

• XREF: The trust/confidence distinction maps onto Stevens’s total, non-alternative-considering deference, which is confidence rather than trust — a key refinement to the reader’s thesis. — connects to: Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk; Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 88; Trust requires controlling one’s own readiness to accept risk — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 161 (+11 more)

Related

• Luhmann distinguishes confidence in institutions from trust between persons (similarity 0.93)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk (similarity 0.92)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.92)
• Luhmannian confidence is blind trust akin to hope, not trust (similarity 0.89)
• Whether disappointment depends on one’s own behavior distinguishes trust from mere confidence (similarity 0.87)
• Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.85)
• Survey ‘trust in government’ reduces to confidence, not interpersonal trust (similarity 0.84)
• Trust is confidence expressing faith in others’ probity or in abstract principles. (similarity 0.84)
• Trust involves a calculable asymmetry of possible harm, while hope does not (similarity 0.84)
• Missing confidence saps diffuse sentiment while missing trust blocks decisive action. (similarity 0.83)
• Trusting a government is not analogous to trusting another person. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a degree of expected probability, not a separate decision layered onto risk. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust requires controlling one’s own readiness to accept risk (similarity 0.83)
• Testing trust requires a concrete setting and visible relation to one’s own risk decisions (similarity 0.83)
• Liberalism shifts expectations from confidence to trust but neglects the confidence that participation requires (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Trust requires controlling one’s own readiness to accept risk #qualifies (0.50) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 161