Luhmannian confidence is blind trust akin to hope, not trust

Evidence

Where trust is involved, in Luhmann’s view, alternatives are consciously borne in mind by the individual in deciding to follow a particular course of action. Someone who buys a used car, instead of a new one, risks purchasing a dud. He or she places trust in the salesperson or the reputation of the firm to try to avoid this occurrence. Thus, an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of confidence, whereas someone who does recognise those alternatives and tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust. In a situation of confidence, a person reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in circumstances of trust she or he must partly shoulder the blame and may regret having placed trust in someone or something. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Trust is not the same as faith in the reliability of a person or system; it is what derives from that faith. Trust is precisely the link between faith and confidence, and it is this which distinguishes it from “weak inductive knowledge.” The latter is confidence based upon some sort of mastery of the circumstances in which confidence is justified. All trust is in a certain sense blind trust! — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 86 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Unenforceable reliance is a gamble and hope, not trust; Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81; Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation (+2 more)

Related

• Luhmann distinguishes confidence in institutions from trust between persons (similarity 0.92)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk (similarity 0.90)
• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. (similarity 0.89)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.89)
• Whether disappointment depends on one’s own behavior distinguishes trust from mere confidence (similarity 0.87)
• All trust is blind trust, being the link between faith and confidence. (similarity 0.86)
• Confidence is a self-fulfilling virtuous spiral unlike superstitious hope (similarity 0.84)
• Trust sits between faith and confidence on an evidence-affect continuum (similarity 0.84)
• Survey ‘trust in government’ reduces to confidence, not interpersonal trust (similarity 0.83)
• Universal trust can be rational in sufficiently benign worlds despite Luhmann (similarity 0.83)
• Liberalism shifts expectations from confidence to trust but neglects the confidence that participation requires (similarity 0.83)
• Missing confidence saps diffuse sentiment while missing trust blocks decisive action. (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose (similarity 0.83)
• Trusting a government is not analogous to trusting another person. (similarity 0.83)
• Unenforceable reliance is a gamble and hope, not trust (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. #corroborates (0.85) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81
• Whether disappointment depends on one’s own behavior distinguishes trust from mere confidence #corroborates (0.85)
• Trust requires belief in the other’s motivations, not mere behavioral expectation #expands (0.80)
• All trust is blind trust, being the link between faith and confidence. #corroborates (0.80) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 86