Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk

Evidence

Where trust is involved, in Luhmann’s view, alternatives are consciously borne in mind by the individual in deciding to follow a particular course of action. Someone who buys a used car, instead of a new one, risks purchasing a dud. He or she places trust in the salesperson or the reputation of the firm to try to avoid this occurrence. Thus, an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of confidence, whereas someone who does recognise those alternatives and tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust. In a situation of confidence, a person reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in circumstances of trust she or he must partly shoulder the blame and may regret having placed trust in someone or something. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: System trust rests on expectations that most won’t test the system; Trust rests on structural system guarantees that relieve individuals of risk assessment; Trust involves a calculable asymmetry of possible harm, while hope does not (+14 more)

Related

• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. (similarity 0.92)
• Luhmann distinguishes confidence in institutions from trust between persons (similarity 0.91)
• Differences in trust are epistemological, not psychological or irrational. (similarity 0.90)
• Luhmannian confidence is blind trust akin to hope, not trust (similarity 0.90)
• Whether disappointment depends on one’s own behavior distinguishes trust from mere confidence (similarity 0.88)
• System trust rests on expectations that most won’t test the system (similarity 0.86)
• Familiarity prevents trust from becoming a conscious problem; doubt reopens it. (similarity 0.86)
• Trust involves a calculable asymmetry of possible harm, while hope does not (similarity 0.86)
• Trusting always exceeds available evidence; reasons for trust are retrospective self-justification (similarity 0.85)
• Trust rests on structural system guarantees that relieve individuals of risk assessment (similarity 0.84)
• Survey ‘trust in government’ reduces to confidence, not interpersonal trust (similarity 0.84)
• Liberalism shifts expectations from confidence to trust but neglects the confidence that participation requires (similarity 0.84)
• Trust in abstract systems is tacit routine, not conscious choice. (similarity 0.83)
• System trust produces a compulsion to trust a system one cannot correct (similarity 0.83)
• Trust is defined by the reason for expectation, not the expectation itself (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Trust operates through uncommunicated inferences rather than explicit justification #corroborates (0.85)
• Trust differs from confidence in that trust acknowledges alternatives and risks, confidence does not. #qualifies (0.50) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 81