Trust is a three-part cognitive relation grounded in truth, not choice

Evidence

Trust is in the cognitive category with knowledge and belief. To say I trust you in some way is to say nothing more than that I know or believe certain things about you—generally things about your incentives or other reasons to live up to my trust, to be trustworthy to me. My assessment of your trustworthiness in a particular context is simply my trust of you. The declarations “I believe you are trustworthy” and “I trust you” are equivalent. If it is cognitive, it follows that trust is not purposive (Baier 1986, 235). I do not trust you in order to gain from interacting with you. Rather, because I do trust you, I can expect to gain from interacting with you if a relevant opportunity arises. Moreover, if trust is cognitive, it is not behavioral. I may act from my trust, and my action may give evidence of my trust, but my action is not itself the trust, although it may be compelling evidence of my trust. If I trust you, I trust you right now and not only in some moment in which I act on my trust by taking a risk on you. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Trust is a three-part relation, not an ungrounded attitude of faith; Individual-level rational-choice accounts of trust fail as general explanations; Trust is a cognitive state of belief, not an action or purpose — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 98 (+9 more)

Broader Connections