Inspection schemes can gather too much information and increase vulnerability

Evidence

In other ways an inspection scheme on the scale required for protection against surprise attack might yield excessive information about the disposition of the other’s forces and make them more vulnerable. … Imagine the state of tension that could occur if either side’s strategic-force personnel began to suffer a severe epidemic that threatened to immobilize them temporarily before the eyes of the other side’s inspection. Much better—if we and they are occasionally to land in a very unalert position for reasons that are impossible to prevent—that neither of us should be in a position to know too much about the other’s occasional disabilities. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 558

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Gambetta’s point that information about others’ weakness invites predation — mutual surveillance of disabilities is itself destabilizing. — connects to: Inspection systems should be overbuilt for crisis contingencies beyond their agreed routine purpose. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 579; Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 801; Any attempt to achieve invulnerability engenders a corresponding vulnerability. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 291 (+5 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: this ‘excessive information’ problem is the mirror image of the concealment/verification dilemma — does it map onto modern supply-chain or corporate disclosure?

Related

• Security against false alarm and against surprise have opposite externalities (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Any attempt to achieve invulnerability engenders a corresponding vulnerability. #expands (0.90) — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 291
• Inspection systems should be overbuilt for crisis contingencies beyond their agreed routine purpose. #contradicts (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 579
• Bureaucratic practices hinder effective management of information secrecy. #complicates (0.85)
• A cheater’s success depends on parasitizing a trustworthy system #expands (0.85)
• Credible threats can require revealing information that defeats the threat #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 801
• Security against false alarm and against surprise have opposite externalities #contradicts (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 827
• Secret-discount auctions create a marketable information commodity for corrupt officials #exemplifies (0.80)