Political barriers can entrench laws as effectively as formal constitutional impediments do.

Evidence

Whatever protects Social Security, the Civil Rights Act, and perhaps other “superstatutes” from revision or repeal, it is not any kind of formal barrier to change. These statutes and the arguably “constitutional” norms they embody are formally susceptible to repeal or revision through the ordinary Article I, Section 7 procedures. Nonetheless, as these theorists recognize, laws and policies can be protected by political barriers that may be every bit as difficult to overcome as constitutional barriers or other formal impediments to change. These laws and policies are functionally, even if not formally, entrenched. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 184

Categorization

  • XREF: Core to the reader’s model: distinguishes formal (textual/constitutional) from functional (political-barrier) entrenchment as two distinct stickiness mechanisms an ideology can acquire. — connects to: A regime can combine nominal constitutional review with aggressive closure of the political arena — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 497; Ordinary statutes can carry quasi-constitutional entrenchment power — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 463; Constitutional amendment may be no harder than founding enactment. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 65 (+5 more)

Broader Connections