Constitutionalism is only one mechanism among several that lock political decisions in.

Evidence

The analysis of entrenchment presented in this Article feeds into several more general currents in public law and democratic theory. There is a vast literature in political science and law on the various mechanisms of democratic design that impede or facilitate political change. These include studies of supermajority and other kinds of voting rules that impose varying degrees of difficulty on departures from the status quo; “temporary” legislation and other timing rules that formally require or expire political actions; institutional arrangements that create or mitigate gridlock in political decision-making processes; the propelling and paralyzing effects of presidential versus parliamentary systems, or party-unified versus divided government; the role of the judiciary in accelerating or braking legal and political transformations; critical theories advocating greater “plasticity” in democratic and social structures; and, of course, constitutionalism. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 512

Categorization

• DEFINE: Provides a working taxonomy of entrenchment mechanisms: voting rules, timing rules, gridlock structures, judicial role, plasticity theory, and constitutionalism.
• XREF: Directly feeds the reader’s project on durable rationalizing ideologies — supermajority rules, sunset legislation, and partisan gridlock are candidate mechanisms explaining why an ideology survives once embedded. — connects to: Legislative power cannot be delegated to hands other than the people’s choice — John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 174; A constitutional authority can end domination only if it tracks citizens’ shared interests — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 343; Formal constitutionalism can obstruct rather than advance revolutionary change — Ambedkar, B R, Annihilation of Caste_ The Annotated…, 104 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• Constitutions entrench policies through structure and rights much as legislation and elections do #corroborates (0.88) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 462
• Constitutions only endure when they reflect actual social power relations #qualifies (0.85) — Ambedkar, B R, Annihilation of Caste_ The Annotated…, 839
• Constitutional entrenchment is real only where not subject to judicial or interpretive change #expands (0.80) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 464
• Formal constitutionalism can obstruct rather than advance revolutionary change #exemplifies (0.78) — Ambedkar, B R, Annihilation of Caste_ The Annotated…, 104
• Objective conditions become political power only through organized capable cadres #exemplifies (0.77) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 785
• A law binds only because sovereign will chose to be bound by it #expands (0.75) — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 197
• A constitutional authority can end domination only if it tracks citizens’ shared interests #qualifies (0.74) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 343
• Legalism paradoxically disables the power it aims to secure #complicates (0.73) — Chuck Missler, The Kingdom, Power and Glory, 1228
• Legislative power cannot be delegated to hands other than the people’s choice #expands (0.72) — John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 174