Communist organizational legacies paradoxically enabled successor parties’ democratic survival

Evidence

Some did resemble the stereotypical fossilized bureaucracy with little interest in genuine representation or engagement. Their elite selection favored ideological loyalty over practical skills, and these elites neither reformed policy nor engaged society. Such parties were unable subsequently to transform themselves into broadly supported democratic competitors. Instead, they were more likely to retain their communist-era appeals and constituencies. Others, however, were far more flexible in their goals and practices, geared toward advancing pragmatic elites, willing to negotiate with the societies they ostensibly governed and to implement economic and political liberalization. These parties could more readily and credibly change their appeals and orientation. … Ironically, therefore, containing democracy in the communist era required many of the same skills and policies that would later make the parties such effective democratic competitors. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 62 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

4. If the sources of these elite resources lie in previous authoritarian practices, these skills and usable pasts should reflect the variation in the organizational practices of the ancien regime. In the case of the communist successor parties, predemocratic organizational practices – internal policies of recruitment and advancement, policy reform, and negotiation with the opposition – influenced the elites’ degree of pragmatic orientation, their ability and will to centralize the parties, and their skill in responding to and communicating effectively with the public, respectively. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 88 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Again the results indicate that the internal characteristics of the successor parties (coefficient = .72) contributed more to their political success in the decade following the collapse of communism than either the degree to which the standard of living declined (measured by declines in HDI and the misery index for 1992–1998) and the degree of nostalgia (both in terms of average nostalgia and changes in the level of nostalgia from 1992 to 1998). Further, average district magnitude also appeared to have little effect on the success of the former communist parties. Taken together, these results question both the nostalgia explanation for the success of the former communist parties and the extent to which institutional openings created political opportunities for the successor parties. These results suggests support for the internalist argument predicts, to a large extent, the degree of political success enjoyed by the successor party. — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 81 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Pre-democratic organizational practices shaped successor parties’ post-regime survival capacities — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 88; Communist-era organizational flexibility determined which parties later thrived democratically — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 62; Successor party resurgence combined post-1989 conditions, communist legacies, and crafted appeals — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 1197 (+29 more)

Related

• Communist-era organizational flexibility determined which parties later thrived democratically (similarity 0.94)
• Pre-democratic organizational practices shaped successor parties’ post-regime survival capacities (similarity 0.93)
• Pre-1989 party organization, not post-transition strategy, determined postcommunist electoral success (similarity 0.93)
• Authoritarian-era organizational practices determine successor parties’ democratic survival skills (similarity 0.92)
• Communist successor parties thrived most where prior regimes suppressed independent challengers (similarity 0.91)
• Past regime practices predict how communist parties exited power (similarity 0.91)
• Communist mass-party organizational forms could not survive democratic transitions (similarity 0.91)
• Distinct organizational practices shaped how successor parties survived (similarity 0.91)
• Prior organizational practices, not ideology, shaped successor party strategies (similarity 0.91)
• Policy-innovation experience without implementation skill hampered successors in democratic competition (similarity 0.90)
• Post-communist party success depended on internal organization, not nostalgia or economic decline (similarity 0.90)
• Past organizational legacies can foster rather than only impede democratic adaptation. (similarity 0.90)
• Democratic success required communist parties to adopt undemocratic organizational means (similarity 0.90)
• Successor party resurgence combined post-1989 conditions, communist legacies, and crafted appeals (similarity 0.89)
• Mid-level elites drove post-communist party transformation. (similarity 0.89)

Broader Connections

• Communist-era organizational flexibility determined which parties later thrived democratically #corroborates (0.93) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 62
• Pre-democratic organizational practices shaped successor parties’ post-regime survival capacities #corroborates (0.92) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 88
• Post-communist party success depended on internal organization, not nostalgia or economic decline #corroborates (0.87) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 81
• Democratic success required communist parties to adopt undemocratic organizational means #qualifies (0.85) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 376
• Communist successor parties post-1989 offer a natural experiment in how organization shapes political survival. #epitomizes (0.80) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 98
• Organizational form determines successor-party survival only under left-wing competitive threat. #qualifies (0.80) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 86
• Communist successor parties thrived most where prior regimes suppressed independent challengers #corroborates (0.80) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 23
• Policy-innovation experience without implementation skill hampered successors in democratic competition #complicates (0.78)
• Successor party resurgence combined post-1989 conditions, communist legacies, and crafted appeals #expands (0.75) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 1197
• Party survival in competitive postcommunist politics requires organizational adaptation, not weak rivals. #expands (0.72) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 97