Prior regime conduct determined whether parties collapsed or negotiated transitions

Evidence

The type and pace of the transitions themselves are actually endogenous to past party practices – the more the party had stonewalled and refused to address society’s grievances, the more likely it was to collapse (as in East Germany, Romania, or in Czechoslovakia). In contrast, the more a party had earlier engaged in negotiation and policy reform, the more likely it was to negotiate its way out of power (as in Poland or in Hungary). Moreover, elections and the development of electoral rules and cleavages tended to follow the period when party regeneration began. Hence, retrospection and adjustment of strategy to reflect environmental feedback became far more problematic. Even as the prospect of democratic competition offered a major motive for the parties to transform in order to better compete, not all parties could respond to this incentive rapidly or effectively. Instead, the parties’ responses to these powerful environmental factors were mediated by internal organizational factors, and specifically, the elites’ ability to devise and implement strategies of regeneration. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 100

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly serves the research question: whether divergent responses to the 1989 loss of the constitutive external enemy trace back to pre-existing internal organizational practices rather than the shock itself. — connects to: Past regime practices predict how communist parties exited power — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 100; Preexisting liberal policies let Hungarian reformists cooperate with opposition before regime change — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 358; A regime’s prior trajectory shapes its present repertoires — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 683 (+1 more)

Broader Connections