Policy-innovation experience without implementation skill hampered successors in democratic competition

Evidence

4. If the sources of these elite resources lie in previous authoritarian practices, these skills and usable pasts should reflect the variation in the organizational practices of the ancien regime. In the case of the communist successor parties, predemocratic organizational practices – internal policies of recruitment and advancement, policy reform, and negotiation with the opposition – influenced the elites’ degree of pragmatic orientation, their ability and will to centralize the parties, and their skill in responding to and communicating effectively with the public, respectively. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 88 (#expands, via linked claim)

Thus, unlike that of the successor parties that face little in the way of structured competition, the success of parties like the HSP and the DLA has been due to these parties’ ability to adapt organizationally to the new competitive circumstances of postcommunist politics, rather than to weak competitors. — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 97 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Communist organizational legacies paradoxically enabled successor parties’ democratic survival; Pre-democratic organizational practices shaped successor parties’ post-regime survival capacities — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 88; Party survival in competitive postcommunist politics requires organizational adaptation, not weak rivals. — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 97 (+2 more)

Related

• Communist organizational legacies paradoxically enabled successor parties’ democratic survival (similarity 0.90)
• Pre-democratic organizational practices shaped successor parties’ post-regime survival capacities (similarity 0.89)
• Party survival in competitive postcommunist politics requires organizational adaptation, not weak rivals. (similarity 0.89)
• Prior organizational practices, not ideology, shaped successor party strategies (similarity 0.87)
• Authoritarian-era organizational practices determine successor parties’ democratic survival skills (similarity 0.87)
• Communist successor parties thrived most where prior regimes suppressed independent challengers (similarity 0.87)
• Communist-era organizational flexibility determined which parties later thrived democratically (similarity 0.87)
• Distinct organizational practices shaped how successor parties survived (similarity 0.86)
• Suppressing democracy trained communist elites in the skills democratic competition later needed (similarity 0.86)
• Weak competitors alone sustain successor party success without genuine organizational transformation. (similarity 0.85)
• Past regime practices predict how communist parties exited power (similarity 0.85)
• Pre-1989 administrative skills ported directly into post-transition democratic competition. (similarity 0.85)
• Past organizational legacies can foster rather than only impede democratic adaptation. (similarity 0.85)
• Pre-1989 party organization, not post-transition strategy, determined postcommunist electoral success (similarity 0.84)
• Prior policy-innovation experience, not governance experience, made successor elites pragmatic and credible. (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• Pre-democratic organizational practices shaped successor parties’ post-regime survival capacities #expands (0.85) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 88
• Party survival in competitive postcommunist politics requires organizational adaptation, not weak rivals. #corroborates (0.82) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 97