Pre-1989 party organization, not post-transition strategy, determined postcommunist electoral success

Evidence

Fundamentally, the answer lies in reexamining the structures and practices of the individual communist parties. Some did resemble the stereotypical fossilized bureaucracy with little interest in genuine representation or engagement. Their elite selection favored ideological loyalty over practical skills, and these elites neither reformed policy nor engaged society. Such parties were unable subsequently to transform themselves into broadly supported democratic competitors. Instead, they were more likely to retain their communist-era appeals and constituencies. Others, however, were far more flexible in their goals and practices, geared toward advancing pragmatic elites, willing to negotiate with the societies they ostensibly governed and to implement economic and political liberalization. These parties could more readily and credibly change their appeals and orientation. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 62

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly parallels the reader’s question about which communist successor parties survived — this locates the causal variable in pre-1989 organizational practice. — connects to: Poland’s communist successor party revived electorally without populist backlash — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 53; Successor party resurgence combined post-1989 conditions, communist legacies, and crafted appeals — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 1197; Post-communist party success depended on internal organization, not nostalgia or economic decline — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 81 (+4 more)

Broader Connections