Mid-level elites drove post-communist party transformation.

Evidence

Some did resemble the stereotypical fossilized bureaucracy with little interest in genuine representation or engagement. Their elite selection favored ideological loyalty over practical skills, and these elites neither reformed policy nor engaged society. Such parties were unable subsequently to transform themselves into broadly supported democratic competitors. Instead, they were more likely to retain their communist-era appeals and constituencies. Others, however, were far more flexible in their goals and practices, geared toward advancing pragmatic elites, willing to negotiate with the societies they ostensibly governed and to implement economic and political liberalization. These parties could more readily and credibly change their appeals and orientation. … Ironically, therefore, containing democracy in the communist era required many of the same skills and policies that would later make the parties such effective democratic competitors. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 62 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Again the results indicate that the internal characteristics of the successor parties (coefficient = .72) contributed more to their political success in the decade following the collapse of communism than either the degree to which the standard of living declined (measured by declines in HDI and the misery index for 1992–1998) and the degree of nostalgia (both in terms of average nostalgia and changes in the level of nostalgia from 1992 to 1998). Further, average district magnitude also appeared to have little effect on the success of the former communist parties. Taken together, these results question both the nostalgia explanation for the success of the former communist parties and the extent to which institutional openings created political opportunities for the successor parties. These results suggests support for the internalist argument predicts, to a large extent, the degree of political success enjoyed by the successor party. — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 81 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Elite skill and pragmatism, not ideology, drove successful party transformation.; Post-communist party success depended on internal organization, not nostalgia or economic decline — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 81; Successor party resurgence combined post-1989 conditions, communist legacies, and crafted appeals — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 1197 (+11 more)

Related

• Elite skill, not ideology, drove communist party organizational regeneration (similarity 0.90)
• Elite skills and party cohesion drive successful postcommunist transformation. (similarity 0.90)
• Party elites, not members or middle managers, drive post-communist party transformation. (similarity 0.89)
• Pre-1989 party organization, not post-transition strategy, determined postcommunist electoral success (similarity 0.89)
• Communist organizational legacies paradoxically enabled successor parties’ democratic survival (similarity 0.89)
• Authoritarian party organizations paradoxically produced skilled elites that won democratic competition (similarity 0.88)
• Centralized parties with experienced elites adapted best to postcommunist elections. (similarity 0.87)
• Communist-era organizational flexibility determined which parties later thrived democratically (similarity 0.87)
• Party survival hinges on internal actions, not external transition pressures (similarity 0.87)
• Elite skill level determined how decisively communist parties reformed at their congresses (similarity 0.86)
• Recruitment openness and internal pluralism determined which communist elites could later transform their parties. (similarity 0.86)
• Post-1989 context rewards streamlined centralized parties over mass-membership ones (similarity 0.86)
• Post-communist party success depended on internal organization, not nostalgia or economic decline (similarity 0.86)
• Past regime practices predict how communist parties exited power (similarity 0.86)
• Centralized party organization enabled flexible appeals that nostalgia could not match (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Elite skill and pragmatism, not ideology, drove successful party transformation. #corroborates (0.85)
• Post-communist party success depended on internal organization, not nostalgia or economic decline #corroborates (0.80) — John T. Ishiyama, Party Organization and the Political…, 81
• Communist-era organizational flexibility determined which parties later thrived democratically #corroborates (0.80) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 62
• Successor party resurgence combined post-1989 conditions, communist legacies, and crafted appeals #expands (0.78) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 1197