Institutions and traditions persist because they are conspicuous coordination solutions.

Evidence

The coordination game probably lies behind the stability of institutions and traditions and perhaps the phenomenon of leadership itself. Among the possible sets of rules that might govern a conflict, tradition points to the particular set that everyone can expect everyone else to be conscious of as a conspicuous candidate for adoption; it wins by default over those that cannot readily be identified by tacit consent. The force of many rules of etiquette and social restraint, including some (like the rule against ending a sentence with a preposition) that have been divested of their relevance or authority, seems to depend on their having become “solutions” to a coordination game: everyone expects everyone to expect everyone to expect observance, so that nonobservance carries the pain of conspicuousness. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 222

Categorization

• XREF: Explains rule systems like sumptuary norms and dress codes through convergent expectations, matching the reader’s immodesty-piece library. — connects to: Formal agreements can strengthen tacit coordination norms. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 605; Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 312; Institutions enabling safe cooperation must precede trustworthiness, which precedes trust (+10 more)

Related

• The esprit de corps of social units persists via self-reinforcing convergent expectations. (similarity 0.82)
• Formal agreements can strengthen tacit coordination norms. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Tacit coordination works through mutually recognized focal points #corroborates (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 134
• The esprit de corps of social units persists via self-reinforcing convergent expectations. #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 223
• Complementary agreements are self-enforcing through interdependence and focal points #corroborates (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 312
• Agreements stay enforceable through the shadow of future bargains #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 118
• Institutions enabling safe cooperation must precede trustworthiness, which precedes trust #expands (0.78)
• Sustained commitment usually depends on external social institutions for enforcement. #expands (0.75)
• Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 676